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Namibia: The Road to Independence
and the Problem of Succession of St ates

Lynn Berat
Yale University

Introduction
After more than a century of colonial rule. the dream of
independence long cherished by the vast majority of Namibians
will soon become a reality. The road from freedom to subjugation
and back again has been a long and tortuous one. Declared a
protectorate by Germany late in the nineteenth century, Namibia. then known as South West Africa. endured some thirty
years of one of the most brutal colonial regimes in Africa. Invaded
by South Africa on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers in
world War I. after the War South West Africa became a League
of Nations mandate administered by South Africa on behalf of the
British Empire. South African rule proved no better than that of
Germany and South Africa treated the mandate as a thinly veiled
annexation .
The post-World War II years brought a new world order,
one in which self -determination became firmly entrenched in the
international jurisprudential corpus . As colonial empires were
dismantled around the world, South Africa clung tenaciously to
South West Africa. Much wrangling over the issue of Namibian
independence between South Africa and the United Nations
eventually resulted in the world body's terminating the mandate.
Nevertheless. South Africa continued its occupation tn defiance
of the wishes of the international community and international
law. Although this prevented the United Nations from assuming
its duties in the territory, the United Nations created a Council
for Namibia to act as the legal government of Namibia in
tnternational fora. Thereafter, the South West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO). which had been founded tn 1960 to
oppose conttnued South African occupation, gained United
Nations recognition as the official representative of the Namibian
people. As a result of Namibia's unique legal status as a ward of
the United Nations, SWAPO never declared itself a governmentIn-exile, pref erring instead to work closely with the Council on
Namibian matters and accepttng observer status in many international bodies.
Then a December 1988 accord put a long-derailed U.N.
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plan for Namibian independence back on track. The result of
many factors, including super power politics, the independence
process began on April 1. 1989, with elections set for November
1. Despite much obfuscation by the South Africans, political
wheeling and dealing was in full swing by mid - 1989. SWAPO,
while perhaps not able to win the majority of the votes needed for
it alone to form a government under the U.N. plan, was thought
likely to garner enough support to make it a major player in any
new Namibian government. Regardless of the outcome of the
elections, the future government of Namibia will be faced with
numerous social. economic, and legal problems . Prime among
these will be the problem of succession of states, i.e . the issue of
which legal obligations the government of a newly -independent
Namibia will inherit. This article will examine Namibia's long
journey from colonial rule to independence. Part I will discuss the
history of its unique legal status and the role of the exiled SWAPO
as a major actor in the struggle for independence. Part II will
consider the problem of succession of states and offer suggestions as to the most prudent path for any new government to
take.

Namibian Independence
Colonialism and the League of Nations
In 1978. the captain of a British warship took possessions of the southwest African port of Walvis Bay and its
hinterland for the British Crown. 1 Six years later, after trying in
vain to persuade the British Government to claim all of what is
today Namibia, the Cape Colony, acting under Letters Patent
issued by Queen Victoria, annexed the port and settlement of
Walvis Bay as well as the surrounding area, a total of 434 square
miles .2 It did so only after Germany, in the same year, claimed the
rest of South West Africa as a protectorate. Germany proved to
be one of the most brutal overlords in the colonial world,
adopting, for example, an extermination policy when the Herera
people rose in revolt against German rule .3
South African forces occupied South West Africa during
the First World War . After the War, according to the terms of
Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany renounced its
sovereignty over its South West African protectorate in favor of
the Allied and Associated Powers which placed the territory
under the mandate system of the League of Nations. The Union
of South Africa administered the territory on behalf of the British
Empire as a class C mandate. The mandate agreement permitted
South Africa to administer the territory as "an integral portion"
34

of the Union, subject to a trust obligation to advance "to the
utmost the matertal and moral well being and the social progress" of the area's indigenous inhabitants. 4 South Afrtca was also
to submit an annual report to the League detailing its administration.5 However , the mandate agreement did not include
Walvis Bay , the only significant port serving South West Afrtca.
in the mandated territory. 6
South Afrtca proceeded to treat the mandate as a veiled
annexation. It continually took actions that implicitly asserted
south Afrtcan sovereignty over the territory. In response. the
Permanent Mandates Commission questioned the Union's behavior and each time Pretoria explained its actions away or
backed down. The League also took South Afrtca to task over its
bombing of civilians in the Bondelswarts Massacre (1922). the
high mortality rate among diamond miners, the territortal debt
structure, and vartous aspects of the mandatory's native policy.7
The Permanent Mandates Commission had ineffectual
supervisory powers . For example, by the time the League discussed them. actions were often faits accomplis. Afrtcans could
not voice their complaints in person or through an agent while
south Afrtca had a representative present at all discussions of
the mandate 's affairs. However, even though the League was
captive to western ethnocentrtsm, the Permanent Mandates
Commission repeatedly rejected South Afrtca's requests for
annexation of the territory.
The United Nations and the International Court of Justice
At the end of the Second World War. the United Nations
replaced the defunct League. All mandated territortes were to
come under the United Nations trusteeship system. At the first
session of the General Assembly, South Afrtca sought to incorporate the territory . The Assembly rejected this suggestion and
decided that South Afrtca should place the mandate under
trusteeship .8 At the time, there was much international pressure
against Sou th Africa's incorporation of the territory including the
lobbying efforts of the Fifth Pan -Afrtcan Congress held in Manchester in 1945. The Congress demanded the submission of the
territory to trusteeship and called for an investigation into the
civil and political rights of the territory's indigenous inhabitants.
Despite the international pressure, South Afrtca refused
to comply with the General Assembly's request to submit the
territory to trusteeship. Its representative, however, promised
that pending a settlement. South Afrtca would continue to
administer the territory "in the spirit of" the mandate. 9 Accordingly, South Afrtca submitted one annual report on its admini35

stration of the territory. The United Nations analysis of the
report's contents was unfavorable to South Africa. In response tn
1948, the newly-elected National Party government, which had
campaigned with the slogan "apartheid," refused to submit any
more reports. The new government also imposed South African
citizenship upon all persons born in the territory and gave the
territory's white residents representation in the Union Parliament.
The General.Assemble and the Union Parliament reached
no accord. Hence, in 1949, the General Assembly asked the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on the
legal status of the territory. 10 The Court wrote that although there
was no legal means of compelling South Africa to submit the
territoryto trusteeship, the Un1oncould not un1laterally alter the
territory's status without the General Assembly's concurrence.
Thus, the mandate principles continued to apply to the territory
while the supervision of its administration devolved upon the
United Nations as the successor to the League. 11
Various General Assembly resolutions urging submission to trusteeship proved ineffective. In 1954 12 and 1955 13 the
General Assembly agaain called upon the Court for guidance on
its supervisory powers. South Africa ref used to accept any of the
Court's opinions insofar as they restricted its administration of
the territory. The General Assembly established a Committee to
negotiate with South Africa on the matter but South Africa
refused to cooperate.
In 1957, the General Assembly established another
committee to consider possible legal actions available to members. The committee issued a report which was highly critical of
the South African admin1stration of the territory. The report also
recommended that member states invoke Article 7 of the mandate agreement to enforce South Africa's obligation to promote
the well being and development of the territory's indigenous
inhabitants. According to the terms of Article 7, South Africa had
agreed in advance to litigate in the International Court any
unresolvable dlspu te referred to the Court involving the interpretation or application of the mandate agreement. 14
In 1960, two former League members, Liberia and Ethiopia, responded to a request from the General Assembly for a
qualified state to bring suit against South Africa under Article 7.
The complaint argued that South Africa had not complied with
its obligation under the mandate agreement and called upon the
Court to grant appropriate relief. 15 In 1962, the International
Court ruled that the plaintiffs were legally entitled to pursue their
claim. 16 Some of the judges including Spender of Australia and
36

Fitzmaurtce of Brttain, however, dissented. These two issued a
Joint opinion.
Four years later, the Court, instead of deciding the case
on its mertts, issued a decision on what it termed an Mantecedent
matter." 17 It held that the plaintiffs had no standing to brtng suit.
The 1962 Joint dissenting opinion of the consetvative Australian
and Brttishjudges became the 1966 majortty opinion by the tiebreaking vote of the Australian who, as Judge President voted
twice. This occurred because of the absence of three liberal
judges from so called Third World countries. The need for
Spender's tie-breaking vote arose from the death of Judge
Badawi of Egypt and the absence of Judge Bustamante of Peru
both of whom had both voted in favor of the plaintiffs in 1962. In
the 1966 case, Judge Spender, without the consent of the rest of
the Court, also disqualified Judge Zafrulah Khan of Pakistan on
the ground that the plaintiffs had asked him to be their judge ad
hoc even though he had not accepted the invitation. 18
South Africa greeted the decision with jubilation. Indeed, celebrations began in that country immediately before the Court
delivered its judgment. The United Nations response to the
decision was to revoke the mandate in General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI). It did so based upon its determination that
South Afrtca's conduct amounted to a repudiation of the mandate agreement. The General Assembly directed South Africa to
end its occupation of the territory and appointed an ad hoc
committee to recommend measures for its administration. In the
sprtng of 1967, the United Nations set up an eleven member
Council for Namibia under a Commissioner for Namibia to
administer the territ _ory while preparing it for independence
under the new con~titution which was to be drafted with popular
participation. 19 However, South Afrtca made it impossible for the
Council to assume its duties in the territory.
Instead of withdrawing from the territory, South Africa
intensified its efforts at annexation, following the recommendations of the Odendaal Plan. 20 This Plan, which was drafted in
1962 -63 while the South West Afrtca cases were pending before
the International Court of Justice, was designed to tum the
territory into a fifth province of South Afrtca. For example, South
Afrtca rescinded the limited home rule it had granted to South
West African whites in 1925: it extended to the area its homeland
policy according to which Afrtcans were divided into ethnic
groups designated by the state ethnographer and relegated to
lands which were supposedly their tribal domain; and it increased its policy and military forces in the territory in an attempt
to crush opposition to its rule from SWAPO which was founded
37

in 1960 to oppose South African domination.
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The Rise of SWAPO

Once great numbers of the Herero people met With
disaster in the wake of a 1904 extermination order by a German
General, many fled to Botswana, where they became the first
South West African exiles . Eager to return to their homeland. in
1947 they enlisted the help of an English clergyman the Rev.
Michael Scott to mass evidence from their compatriots left
behind and present it to the United Nations in an effort to
convince that body that South Africa's desires to incorporate the
territory were contrary to the Wishes of the indigenous inhabitants .22 At the same time, the seeds of political discontent were
flowering among workers inside the country who opposed the
inferior status to which their South African masters relegated
them. 23 Their activities led to the formation in the 1950s of the
Ovamboland People's Congress, later renamed the Ovambo
People's Organization (OPO). In December, 1959, a peaceful
protest in Windhoek, the territory's capital, against the forced
removal of some Africans to a segregated township met With
violence from the authorities . leaving twelve dead and forty five
wounded. 24 The government then imprisoned or banished many
of the organizers . Some, however, including young railway
worker Sam Nujoma, escaped across the border in the second
wave of exiles.
In 1960, Nujoma and many of his compatriots clustered
in Dar es Salaam which was then the nearest capital of an
independent African state . Thereafter some of them appeared in
New York where they petitioned the United Nations on behalf of
those in their homeland. The exiles formed two groups, OPO,
renamed SWAPO in 1960 With Nujoma as president and nonaligned in orientation, and the South West African National
Union (SWANU). which had been founded in 1959 and reportedly
had Maoist sympathies. In those heady days when anti-colonial
fervor was sweeping much of the world, both groups received
international recognition, particularly from the newly -independent states .
The year 1964 brought a shift in SWAPO's fortunes . The
Liberation Committee of the recently-formed Organization of
African Unity (OAU) inquired as to whether each of the groups
was willing to engage in the armed struggle against South African
domination . SWAPO indicated that it was prepared to do so but
SWANU refused With the result that the OAU thereafter backed
SWAPO exclusively. 25 SWANU. which continues to exist. then
became a minor player in the struggle for independence. SWAPO
38

meanwhile. proceeded to grow in stature in the eyes of the
international community . The 1965 General Conference of the
sWAPO Executive Committee, held in Dar es Salaam, was partly
responsible for this because it took steps to increase links with
sWAPO compatriots in the country and to adopt a program for
the most efficacious way of managing foreign financial contribu tions to its struggle. 26 In 1966 , after the ICJ's unsatisfactory
decision in the case brought by Liberia and Ethiopia against
south Africa, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PIAN),
sWAPO's military wing, began the armed struggle. 27 As one
SWAPO leader put it, M(w)ecould secure our freedom only by
28
fighting for it . M
PIAN's activities met with swift and violent
repression form the South Africans but tales of South African
atrocities only increased the sympathy for SWAPO among the
members of the international community.

The Mandate Terminated and SWAPO's Struggle Transformed
In 1968. at SWAPO's request, the General Assembly
changed the name of the territory from South West Africa to
Namibia . Then, in 1969, the Security Council issued an ultima tum to South Africa demanding its withdrawal form the territory
on October 4 of that year . The resolution noted that South Africa
had committed Maggressive encroachment on the authority of the
U.N., a violation of the territorial integrity and a denial of the
political sovereignty of the people of Namibia. "29 Still South Africa
remained .
In 1970, the Security Council asked the International
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the proper conduct
of states in regard to the territory .30 In its fourth advisory opinion
relating to South West Africa/Namibia, the Court whose composition had changed since 1966, wrote that South Africa should
withdraw its administration from the territory. Other states members and non-members of the United Nations- should treat
South Africa's administration of the territory as illegal and refuse
to recognize any actions taken by the South Africans for the
territory. Moreover. the Court noted that to Mestablish ... and
enforce distinctions. exclusions. restrictions, and limitations
exclusively based on grounds of race, colour. descent or national
or ethnic origin which constitute a denial offundamental human
rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the
(U.N.) Charter." 31
In light of this opinion, the United Nations tried yet again
to end South Africa's illegal occupation of the territory. From
1971 to 1973 the Security Council passed several resolutions
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calling upon states to take various actions to bring pressure on
South Africa. In 1972, the Security Council sent the SecretaryGeneral on a mission to the territory but Namibia came no closer
to independence.
Meanwhile, the General Assembly concerned itself with
actions it could take outside the territory. In 1971, it established
the Fund for Namibia to assist refugees from the territory. Then,
in 1973, it recognized SWAPO as the "authentic" representative
of the Namibian people. 32 In 1974, it authorized a yearly sum for
the maintenance ofa SWAPO office in New York. Two years later,
it called SWAPO "the sole and authentic representative of the
Namibian people" and gave it observer status at the United
Nations. 33 This recognition of the legal status of a liberation
movement reflected developments in the new international legal
order of the last half of the twentieth century in which the rtght
of self determination had become entrenched in theJus cogen.s,
basic, fundamental, imperative or overriding rules of international law, peremptory norms "which cannot be set aside by
treaty or acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent
norm of contrary effect. "34
In 1974, Portuguese rule in Mozambique and Angola
collapsed, transforming SWAPO's struggle against South African
domination. Psychologically, this raised hopes of independence
among Namibians. Militarily, it enabled PLAN to operate along
Namibia's northern border with Angola. As SWAPO's military
fortunes grew, so did its political standing both within and
without the territory. Numerically, SWAPO experienced a dramatic surge in membership in the first few months following
Angolan independence when some 20,000 Namibians. the third
major wave of exiles, crossed the border. Many of them made
their way to Health and Education Centers which SWAPO had,
by then established in Angola and Zambia. These centers, which
included schools, clinics, and training in craft-making, won
SWAPO further respect in international circles. In all, some
80,000 exiled Namibians were thought to be in these SWAPO
centers. a significant proportion of the total estimated Namibian
population of 1.3 to 1.5 million. Still others went to Europe. the
United States, Commonwealth countries, and elsewhere as
students on United Nations or other scholarships. SWAPO's
official presence around the world also expanded. A European
office opened in the United Kingdom in 1969 and it oversaw
relations with France, West Germany, Sweden, Romania, Yugoslavia, and East Germany. 35 It was followed by offices in New
Delhi and Melbourne. Even as SWAPO's numbers in exile grew,
the group continued to strengthen its ties within the country
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where it received much support from the churches .
In spite of its international recognition as the official
representative of the Namibian people and its widespread internal support . never. however, did SWAPO declare itself a govern ment -in -exile. Recognizing Namibia's unique international legal
status as a ward of the United Nations, SWAPO accepted the
council for Namibia's role as the internationally-recognized
government of Namibia until independence could occur . Accordingly. working closely with the Council In many spheres. SWAPO
contented itself with observer status in various international fora
where the Council took actions on Namibia 's behalf .36
International Initiatives: The 1970s and 1980s
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s. the United Nations
persisted in pressing for Namibian Independence and in taking
actions meant to safeguard the rights of the Namibian people
until emancipation arrived . In 1974, for example. the United
Nations General Assembly which had just appointed its first fullume Commissioner for Namibia took various actions . It created
the United Nations Institute for Namibia to give young Namibians
the skills required to enable them to administer their country
after independence. 3 7 The General Assembly also issued a decree
aimed at protecting Namibia's interests by making it unlawful for
companies to exploit or export any of Namibia's natural re sources without the authorization of the Council for Namibia . In
addition, the decree provided for the seizure of the resources
involved in case of contravention of Its terms and empowered the
government of a future independent Namibia to sue offenders for
dam ages. 38
Also. in 1974, the Security Council passed Resolution
366 which demanded that South Africa leave Namibia and
threatened economic sanctions if that country did not comply.
However, in exchange for the agreement of the western nations.
the wording of the sanctions clause - weaker that in the draft
version - failed to conform to the required formula under Chapter
VU of the United Nations Charter. South Africa ignored the
resolution. In response, the majority of the Security Council
voted in favor of an arms embargo against Sou th Africa . The three
western permanent members of the Council - the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France - vetoed the measure. This was
the first of what became known as the triple veto on Namibian
issues .
In mid-1975. South Africa sent troops to seize the Calueque power station on the Cunene River. which forms the
border between Namibia and Angola. as well as strategic areas in
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the vicinity. Within a few months it was negotiating with then
United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to send troops
north in collaboration with the pro-South African UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) movement led
by Jonas Savimbi. At the same time. another Angolan faction the
FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) aided by the
C.I.A. was to attack yet another Angola faction, the MPLA
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). form the
Zairean border. The invading South Africans reachedjust to the
south of the Angolan capital of Luanda but MPI.A forces backed
by Cuban troops sent in at the MPlA's request drove the South
Africans back into Namibia. 39
At that time, the Security Council drafted a plan to
remove South Africa from Namibia and to install a representativ e
Namibian government. Lengthy negotiations ensued. In January. 1976. the Security Council adopted Resolution 395. This
resolution provided that: 1) South Africa should abandon Namibia at once and that the United Nations should temporaril y
administer the area: 2) the United Nations should have ample
time to prepare Namibia for an election in which all Namibian s
would freely determine their own future: 3) an election should be
held on a Namibia-wide basis "under United Nations supervisio n
and control": and 4) in the period before South Africa transferre d
power to the United Nations that country should abolish homelands and all discriminatory and repressive laws, release all
political prisoners. permit all exiles to return safely, and grant
full human rights to all. The resolution assumed that those
Namibians elected in the United Nations-controlled election
would draft a constitution under which Namibia would become
· independent. The resolution listed August 31 as the deadline for
South Africa's compliance. 40
South Africa did not acquiesce and another triple veto
saved it from a comprehensive arms embargo. Indeed. during the
period from the end of Portuguese rule in Angola. South Africa
increased repression in Namibia. It stringently enforced and
expanded upon its homeland policy while at the same time
offering to negotiate with United Nations officials. As the strength
of the MPlA grew in Angola. South Africa resurrected an earlier
plan to create a greater Ovamboland which was to include
Ovambos from both sides of Namibia's northern border with
Angola and function. with a pro South African leader. as a buffe r
state between Namibia and Angola. The plan failed.
In 1977 there was the formation of the so-called Western
Contact Group under the leadership of the self-declared proAfrican administration of United States President Jimmy Carter.
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The Contact Group consisted of the three permanent western
members of the Security Council as well as Canada and West
Germany then newly-elected non-permanent members of the
council. Reacting to South Africa's failed Turnhalle Conference
in Windhoek which was to have established a pro-SouthAfricanbacked "Internal Parties", the five took it upon themselves to
devise an "internationally acceptable solution" to the Namibian
problem .
In the midst of negotiations with the Contact Group
concerning a possible settlement of the Namibian issue and an
agreement for elections in the territory, the South African regime,
anticipating the establishment of an independent Namibia,
endeavored to solidify its position in the area. It appointed an
Adminis trator -General for Namibia and vested plenary legislative and administrative power in him. 41This action installed a
"local" official of co equal status with any United Nations official
who might oversee United Nations sponsored elections in Namibia .42
In addition, South Africa persisted with internal elections
in December , 1978. Widely boycotted by SWAPO supporters, the
elections were won by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA),
a pro-South African party formed after the Turnhalle conference
failed. The DTA formed an interim government which remained
subordinate to the South West African administrator who had
actual authority for the territory. The weak interim government
collapsed in 1983 but it was resurrected in 1985 when it became
a major player in another South African sponsored government,
the Transitional Government of National Unity.
Ever since South Africa flouted the United Nations inde pendence plan in 1978. the international body had been unable
to induce South Africa to come to the bargaining table once more .
Still South Africa continued to indicate a willingness to negotiate
in what is best construed as a propaganda ploy to divert
international attention from focussing on internal South African
matters . Thus, in January, 1986, when South African President
P.W. Both aannounced a willingness to negotiate on Namibian
issues , he offered an August date for South African withdrawal
from Namibia .43This withdrawal was conditioned upon the exit
of some 30,000 Cuban troops from Angola. The troops were there
at the invitation of the Angolan government and assisted it in its
struggle against the South African and United States backed
guerilla forces of UNITA. The South African precondition for its
departure from Namibia, known as linkage, was first insisted
upon by United States Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Chester Crocker in 1981 and was adopted unanimously
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by the South Africans. 44
In light of the linkage issue, the South African overture
appears to have been disingenuous for at the time the speech was
made, the Reagan Administration was courting Jonas Savimbi,
the UNITA leader as an anti communist hero and offering him
assistance in his efforts to overthrow the Angolan government.
Such circumstances, of course made it impossible for the Angolans to entertain any thought of removing the Cubana and
precluded the possibility that negotiations regarding Namibian
independence would occur.
Meanwhile, the international press and the international
community, perhaps tired of the failure of so many past attempts, merely yawned . The deadline came and went without any
developments . By that time, the international community was
preoccupied with ending white minority rule in South Africa
where growing black unrest and corresponding state repression
had become a cause celebre among the international media. The
Namibian issue thus disappeared from the cynosure. Its absence
was not to be for long.
By 1988 South Africa had entered a quieter phase. A
nation-wide state of emergency declared in June 1986 and
annually renewed had resulted, at least temporarily, in the
quashing of black protest. Stringent censorship laws and the
expulsion of many foreign journalists had succeeded in removing
news of violent confrontation from the world's newspapers. radio
broadcasts, and television screens . Nevertheless, by then the
South African Economy was in shambles . Its military presence
in Namibia and Angola was proving extremely costly both in
human and monetary terms and a disastrous battle at Cuito
Cuanavale in Angola at which a larger number of white South
Afrtcans died had put South Afrtcan military superiority in
doubt. At home, continued military Involvement was particularly
unpopular with young white men who, by law, are bound to serve
for two years in the South African armed forces. 45 The cost of
running Namibia became a drain on the South African budget.
In the international sphere, the superpowers were keen
to reach some accord in southern Africa. In the age of glasnost
and perestroika. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was bent on
ending his country's involvement in various regional conflicts
around the world . Crocker of the United States was particularly
keen to win a major policy victory in the area, his only one in
nearly seven years. Angola, devastated by years of civil war
wished to normalize relations with the United States and have a
measure of stability. Cuba, too, had been sending signals to
Washington indicating a desire for at least some thaw in rela44

uons.

The coalescence of these factors resulted in United
states-brokered
talks beginning in July 1988 among Cuba.
Angola, and South Africa which eventually resulted in a timetable for withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola acceptable to
south Africa. and paved the way for the implementation of
security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, the U.N. plan for
Namibian independence. Not formally included in the talks was
the Soviet Union which had observer status but which, represented by senior diplomat. Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly
Adamishin. no doubt brought much pressure to bear on its
Cuban and Angolan clients. Also absent was SWAPO which
south Africa continued to refuse to recognize as having any
special claim to represent the Namibian people.
Finally. on December 22, 1988, an agreement was signed
inNewYorkprovidingforthe
implementation of the U.N. plan for
u.N.-supervised elections leading to Namibian independence. 46
Under the agreement. the process was to begin on April 1. 1989
with the arrival of the United Nations Transitional Assistance
group in Namibia. Elections for a Constituent Assembly which
would draft a constitution were scheduled for November 1 with
independence to follow early in 1990. Walvis Bay. Namibia's only
port. was excluded from the independence plan. thus throwing
open the door to continued South African military and economic
domination of Namibia. 47
The independence process did not begin smoothly; there
were confrontations between SWAPO forces and South African
troops which created an international brouhaha and saw South
Africa threaten to withdraw from the agreement. Other difficulties soon emerged including the use of violence and various
intimidatory tactics by the South Africans who wished to diminish support for SWAPO.48 South Africa also took an interest in the
activities of the various political parties which numbered more
than thirty. By mid summer 1989, under a condition of the
independence agreement. South Africa had granted amnesty to
the exiles and large numbers ofSWAPO members. many of whom
had been out of the country for nearly thirty years, were back in
Namibia or on their way home. Observers believed that despite
the South African animosity toward SWAPO, the group would
garner the largest share of votes in the November 1 elections.
thus assuring itself a place as a major actor in shaping the future
of an independent Namibia.

Namibia and the Problem of Succession
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of States

The Nature of the Problem
Any new government that comes to power in Namibia,
whether it is dominated by SWAPO or not. will be beset by myriad
economic, social. and legal problems . It will inherit an economy
in shambles. Namibia relies on the export of raw materials to a
greater extent than perhaps any other country in the world. 49 In
addition, its mineral wealth and major source of income has been
exploited by multinational corporations concerned only with
financial gain in violation of a United Nations decree prohibiting
such practices. 50 Namibia's fishing industry has collapsed through
over-exploitation and its only port, Walvis Bay, the center of the
fishing industry and the place through which ninety percent of
Namibia's exports pass will remain in South African hands after
Namibian independence .51 In social terms, the legacy of German
and then South African occupation has been disastrous. The
people, particularly in the north. where the majority of the
population lives. have been ravaged by the effects of more than
twenty years' war of liberation waged by SWAPO against the
occupying South African forces. Governmental services such as
health care and education remain woefully inadequate. 52
On the legal front, the new Namibian government will be
confronted with the problem of succession of states. i.e. "the legal
consequences of a change of sovereignty over territory. "53 In this
case, a question arises as to which of the rights and obligations
of the "predecessor state" pass to the "successor state." Of
particular relevance is the issue of which obligations regarding
treaties and private property a freely-elected Namibian government will assume upon independence. These become crucial
decisions especially in a state confronted with dismal economic
realities which. undoubtedly, will actively seek foreign investment and aid in an effort to develop.
The dilemma facing the new Namibian government is the
same as that described by former President Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania who said, in 1961. when the independence of his
country was imminent:
The Government is naturally anxious that the
emergence ofTanganyika as an independent State
should in general cause as little disruption as
possible to the relations which previously existed
between foreign States and Tanganyika. At the
same time, the Government must be vigilant to
ensure that where international law does not
require it, Tanganyika shall not in the future be
bound by pre-independence commitments which
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are no longer compatible with their new status
and interest. 54
Before the issues of succession raised by Nyerere can be
addressed, however, it is imperative to examine the nature of the
predecessor state from which will pass the rights and obligations
that the new Namibian government will assume.

The Issue of Sovereignty
As indicated above, once Germany lost World War I,
German South-West Africa became a Class C mandate under the
League of Nations system and the Union of South Africa, now the
Republic of South Africa, administered the mandated territory
on behalf of the British Empire. 55 Although, this transfer of power
ended German sovereignty over the area, it did not mean that
sovereignty was vested in the League of Nations. The League was
an international organization with certain international rights
and duties. Its nature was, however, suigeneris, in the international law of the day. It possessed none of the attributes of
statehood , namely a permanent population. a defined territory,
a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other
States. 56 Accordingly, sovereignty over Namibia did not vest in
the League, which. instead, had supervisory power over mandates.
Sovereignty over South West Africa also did not vest in
South Africa despite the expressed intention of South Africa to
the contrary. From the start, South Africa treated the mandate
as a veiled annexation. It continually took actions that asserted
South African sovereignty over the territory. The Permanent
Mandates Commission repeatedly rejected any act of suggestion
that a mandatory had sovereignty over a mandated territory. For
example, when the preamble to the 1926 Portuguese-South
African treaty delimiting the boundary between South West
Africa and Angola provided that "the Government of the Union of
South Africa, subject to the terms of the said mandate, possesses
sovereignty over the territory of South West Africa lately under
the sovereignty of Germany. "57 the Commission objected. In a
report to the League Council it indicated that
(u)nder the circumstances,
the Commission
doubts whether such an expressionas "possesses
sovereignty," used in the preamble to the abovementioned Agreement, even when limited by such
a phrase as that used in the above-quoted passage, can be held to define correctly, having
regard to the terms of the Covenant, the relations
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existing between the mandatory power and the
territory placed under its mandate. 58
Subsequently, in 1927 and 1930, the Council passed resolutions
stipulating that mandatory powers did not have sovereignty over
their mandates.
It would seem. then, that by default. sovereignty over
South West Africa vested in the people themselves. This was not
the case. In international practice. League of Nations mandates
and later, in the early post World War II years, trust territories
under the United Nations, were dependent territories and in
terms of succession of states, they received the same treatment
as colonies. Accordingly, they had no sovereignty before independence . Sovereignty over South West Africa. therefore, remained in suspension . This view was expressed by Lord McNair
in his separate opinion in the International Court of Justice's
1950 advisory opinion on the legal status of the territory. He
wrote that "sovereignty over a Mandated Territory is in abeyance;
if and when the inhabitants of the territory obtain recognition as
an independent state. as has already happened in the case of
some of the Mandates. sovereignty will revive and vest in the new
state ."59
Following this view. it would appear that a new Namibia
will begin its life as a new state, a tabula rasa in international
relations . However. it is more appropriate to argue that because
of its peculiar international legal status prior to independence,
the Council for Namibia must be deemed to be the predecessor
state for some purposes.

The Councll for Namibia as Predecessor State
In October. 1966, after being rebuffed by the International Court of Justice in a case brought by Liberia and Ethiopia,
two former League members, alleging that South Africa had not
complied with its obligations under the mandate agreement and
calling upon the Court to grant appropriate relief, 60 the General
Assembly terminated the South African mandate over Namibia. 61
In 1969, the Security Council approved of the General Assembly's
decision. 62 Meanwhtle, in 1967, the General Assembly had
created tli.e United Nations Council for South West Africa, later
renamed Namibia, composed of eleven member states and
authorized it to: 1) administer South West Africa until independence with the maximum participation of the inhabitants; 2)
promulgate legislation required for the administration of the
Territory until a legislative assembly could be elected on the basis
of universal adult suffrage; 3) take immediate measures. in
consultation with the inhabitants. to establish a constitutional
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assembly with the object of drawing up a constitutional assembly
with the object of drawing up a constitution; 4) maintain law and
order: and 5) transfer all powers to the people of the territory
following the declaration of independence. 63
While South African intransigence over the issue of
Namibian independence has prohibited the Council from assuming its responsibilities inside Namibia, it has represented Namibia in an number of international organizations and in relations with various states. The Council enjoys a dual status as
both an organ of the United Nations and as the legal administering authority for Namibia. It does so in accordance with relevant
General Assembly resolutions and other United Nations pronouncements. Most important of these is a General Assembly
resolution of 1977 which specified the Council's tasks "as an
organ of the United Nations" and "as the legal Administering
Authority for Namibia. "64 That it remains subordinate to United
Nations authority is indicated by the annual reports which it
submits to the General Assembly regarding its activities and in
which it requests General Assembly approval for its future
endeavors. 65
While the Council for Namibia. like the League of Nations,
does not meet the requirements for statehood and therefore does
not meet the criteria for membership in many international
organizations, it has participated on behalf of Namibia as an
observer without the right to vote in many such organizations.
Examples include the United Nations Educational. Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the International Labor Organization (ILO): the World Health Organization (WHO): and the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
Again, because of Namibia's peculiar international status,
the Council for Namibia is not the only organization that has
represented Namibian interests in international bodies. This
function also has been performed by SWAPO which various
United Nations 66 and Organization of African Unity67 resolutions
have described as "the sole and authentic" representative of the
"Namibian people. "The role ofSWAPO has not. however, caused
difficulties in the international arena as a result of various
General Assembly resolutions which call upon international
organizations and conferences to permit the participation ofboth
the Council for Namibia and SWAPO "when the rights and
interests of Namibia are involved. "68 The Council's authority also
seems to be superior to that of SWAPO both in terms of
international practice and by SWAPO's own admission. For
example, while both organizations have participated in the
proceedings of organizations such as UNESCO, FAO, WHO, and
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the ILO, in 1978 the ILO admitted Namibia as a full member
represented by the Council; accordingly, SWAPO did not participate as a separate entity during the next annual ILO conference
but instead some of its members were pat of the Council's
delegation .
That SWAPO accepts the Council's superiority as far as
succession of states is concerned was made apparent at the
1977 /78 United Nations Conference on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties. The SWAPO representative emphasized that
"South Africa could not, therefore, be regarded as a predecessor
State ofNamibia ... Only the United Nations Council for Namibia
could claim the right to assume responsibility for the territory's
treaty relations with other interested states. "69 The Council for
Namibia's view was in accord on this point. Its representative
stated that because the United Nations had, pursuant to the
appropriate General Assembly resolutions, "assumed direct
responsibility for the territory of Namibia. That country was
therefore a suigeneris case. in that its predecessor ...would be the
United Nations itself. The delegation of the United Nations
Council for Namibia therefore, hoped that the special case of
Namibia would be taken into account. "7o
Indeed, the Conference members recognized that the
Council for Namibia had long acted as guardian of the interests
of the Namibian people while South Africa. in violation of
international law, had continued to occupy and impose upon
Namibia its apartheid system, already designated a "crime
against humanity" by the members of the international community.71 The Conference then resolved that "South Africa is not the
predecessor State of the future independent State of Namibia. "72
Having thus concluded that the Council for Namibia,
although not a state itself, must, for limited purposes, be seen as
the predecessor state of a newly-independent Namibia, there
remains the question as to what this implies insofar as the
obligations of the new government are concerned. As indicated,
state succession has effects on rights and obligations in the
broad areas of treaties and private rights.
The Obligations of a New Government
l. Treaties
Modern treaty law is governed by the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties of 1978 to which the Council for Namibia
is a signatory. 73 Expressly applicable to a state succession which
has occurred only after the entry into force of the Convention, it
is a product of the entrenchment of the right of self-determina50

uonin the internationaljurisprudentialcorpusin
the post-World
war II ear. 74 Accordingly, it adopts the tabula rasa or clean slate
doctrine which does not involve rejection of the continuity of
treaties but implies that the newly-independent state is entitled
to choose which treaties concluded by its predecessor will be
regarded as continuing and which will be considered as terminated.
Under the Vienna Convention. a newly-independent state
is not "bound to maintain in force, or become a party to. any
treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of the succession
of States the treaty was in force in respect to the territory to which
the succession relates ."75 A newly-independent state is therefore
free to choose whether or not to become a party to a multilateral
treaty. It may establish its status as a contracting state to a
multilateral treaty which is not in force and, if it does exercise
those rights. it enjoys all the rights regarding reservations
enjoyed by the predecessor state. On the other hand. a newly independent state succeeds to a bilateral treaty only with the
express or implicit agreement of the other state party. the effect
being to constitute direct treaty relations which are independent
of the fate of treaty relations with the predecessor state.
The members of the international community recognized
the necessity of applying the tabula rasa doctrine to an independ ent Namibia at the United Nations Conference on Succession of
States in respect ofTreaties of 1977 and 1978. 76 as well as during
the Untied Nations Conference on Succession of States in
Respect of State Property. Archives and Debts of 1983 .77 It was
the view of the representative of the Council for Namibia that the
Council
noted with satisfaction that the International Law Commission had adopted the "clean-slate" principle in accordance with which the newly-independent State had the
right to decide whether or not it wished to remain a party
to a treaty concluded by the predecessor State. That
principle safeguarded the legitimate interest of newly
independent States and enabled them to reject colonial
heritages which might prejudice their economy and the
well -being of their inhabitants. It thus helped to safeguard the interest and natural resources ofNamibia ...The
Council considered that, in the case of Namibia, failure to
apply the "clean-slate" principle would impose an intolerable burden on the territory once it had become independent. 78
The western powers echoed this view. The British representative said, for example. that his government "hoped that
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Namibia, on attaining independence, would be allowed to benefit
from the application of the "clean-slate" doctrtne. 79 As the
Director of the United Nations Institute for Namibia put it at the
opening session of the 1984 Seminar on State Succession to
Rights and Obligations and Law in Namibia, "any recommendations on state succession to rights and obligations should aim at
assisting an independent Namibia to embark on a social, political
and economic reconstruction programme and exercise the terrttorial rights and the right to exploit its wealth unfettered by past
colonial or any other claims. "80
Since, as has been demonstrated, South Africa, because
of its internationally illegal conduct in connection with Namibia
cannot and should not be seen to be the predecessor state of an
independent Namibia, any South African treaties, which also
made themselves applicable to Namibia, must not be viewed as
proper objects for succession of states. The result is dilferent in
the case of treaties entered into by the Council for Namibia
which, for this purpose, must be regarded as the predecessor
state. These treaties, most of which are multilateral, such as the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 81 the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 82 the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 83 the Geneva
Conventions on the Laws ofWar, 84 and the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties 85 are proper objects for state succession. A
new Namibian government may wish to maintain these treaties
in force because they were entered into by a body which acted as
a guardian of the interests of the Namibian people and which, in
addition, received further credibility regarding its dealings by the
active participation of SWAPO which enjoys wide support in
Namibia; indeed, both actively participated in the negotiations
for many of these treaties.

ll. Private Rights
In addition to treaties, state succession also impacts
upon private rights. Whether an independent Namibia will have
to honor the rights of foreign nationals. particularly foreign
corporations in that country. should be a matter of grave
concern. At present the Namibian economy is controlled by
South African corporations and multinational enterprises. For
example, a 1985 United Nations study revealed that four multinational corporations "account for about 95 percent of the
territory's mineral production and exports and hold approximately 89 percent of its mineral assets. "86 Such companies
operate in Namibia in violation of international law.
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In its 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, the International Court of Justice took the position that
state members of the United Nations are under
obligation to recognize the illegality of South
Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of
its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia and to
refrain from any acts and in particular any dealing with the government of South Africa implying
recognition of the legality of or leading support or
assistance to such presence and administration.87
Also in this vein, in 197 4, the Council for Namibia, acting as the
legal representative of Namibia promulgated, and the General
Assembly later endorsed. Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the
Natural Resources of Namibia. Relevant sections provided that
1) No person or entity, whether a body corporate
or unincorporated may search for, prospect for.
explore for, take extract. mine, process, refine,
use. sell, export or distribute any natural resource whether animal or mineral. situated or
found to be situated within the territorial limits of
Namibia without the consent and permission of
the United Nations Council for Namibia or any
person authorized to act on its behalf for the
purpose of giving such permission or such consent:
2) Any permission. concession or license for all or
any of the purposes specified in paragraph 1
above whensoever granted by any person or entity, including any body purporting to act under
the authority of the Government of the Republic
of South Africa or the MAdministration of South
West Africa" or their predecessors, is null, void
and of no force or effect. 88
Although the Council hoped to preserve Namibia's wealth for the
benefit of the Namibian people, the multinational corporations
ignored the decree. Instead, a 1986 report by a South West
African Commission of Inquiry known as the Thirion Commission Report after the Commission's chairman Mr. Justice Thirion, revealed that the multinationals, fearful of the prospect that
Namibia would one day become independent. had adopted
methods geared toward extracting the most from the mines in the
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short term without regard for the mines· longevity .89 Given the
reality of over-exploitation coupled with the fact that since 1966
when the General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate ove;
Namibia. all such dealings have been illegal. it would appear
logical that an independent Namibia would wish to apply the
clean slate doctrine with regard to its dealings with private
concerns. Here. however. there is much international law to the
contrary although it must be pointed out that this law was made
by western states desirous of protecting the business interests of
their nationals.
When a new state comes into being. the private
property rights of those living or doing business there do not
necessarily lapse. In terms of the actions a successor state can
take. there is a distinction between the rights of nationals of the
new state and of foreign nationals . As far as nationals of the new
state are concerned, the government may freely appropriate their
property. subject perhaps only to constraints placed upon it by
international human rights treaties which it may have chosen to
succeed to or to become party to. The rule is dilf erent in the case
of foreign nationals. There, the new state must undertake the
expropriation for a public purpose and must give appropriate
compensation. As the Permanent Court of International Justice
suggested in 1923, "Private rights acquired under existing law do
not cease on a change of sovereignty. "90
While such rules remain in the international legal
corpus. most of the so-called Third World countries do not accept
them. Although they often recognize that these western rules are
appropriate with regard to investments made in the post-independence era. they insist that for the period prior to independence when they were unable to protect their interests. any
agreements entered into by the predecessor state were exploitive
and unequal. While this reasoning seems particularly logical in
the case of Namibia where the predecessor state. the Council.
with the weight of international law behind it. recognized as
illegal the South African approved Namibian investments of
multinational corporations. an argument can be made for
Namibia's adherence to the western rules.
With its economy so heavily dependent upon extraction, an independent Namibia will undoubtedly seek to diversity
its economy and encourage the development of local manufacturing. Presumably such manufacturing could be established
with the help of foreign investors. bearing in mind that it
behooves the new government to establish a sound investment
policy. Such a policy should ensure that each enterprise has a
certain percentage of Namibian participation and also require
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that f1.n11sestablish social welfare programs in areas such as
education. health, and career development for employees and
their families. This will not occur if, by nationalizing the currently
operating multinational corporations, the new Namibian govern ment succeeds in alienating foreign investors .
At the same time, it is also true that those multinationals responsible for the depletion of Namibian resources should be
made to make reparations for their misdeeds. In this case,
negotiations conducted with the utmost diplomacy may succeed
in securing an infusion of currency and know how not only from
the multinationals themselves but also from the governments of
their home countries which may be unwilling to be branded as
crude exploiters in various international fora . For a new Namib ian government faced with overwhelming economic and social
problems , cooperation and not confrontation may be the wisest
path.

conclusion
The question of Namibian independence has long
attracted the attention of the international community. After two
decades of wrangling with South Africa over its occupation of
Namibia , the General Assembly, in 1966, revoked South Africa's
mandate over the territory . South Africa, however, still remained.
Meanwhile , SWAPO, which after some years of fruitless peaceful
protests had begun the armed struggle in an effort to dislodge
South Africa, garnered an increasing amount of international
support . It eventually gained U.N. recognition as the official
representative of the Namibian people but stopped short of
declaring itself a government -in-exile. Rather. it has remained a
would -be -government working closely with the U.N. Council for
Namibia which the international body recognizes as Namibia's
legal administering authority. In this capacity, the Council has
entered into many international agreements on behalf of Namibia.
In mid-1989, as Namibia appears to be on the verge of
becoming independent. it behooves those concerned with the
legal obligations of the future polity to consider the problem of
succession of states , particularly with regard to international
treaties and private rights. Analysis reveals that South Africa .
because of its years of occupation in contravention of interna tional law , is not the predecessor state of an independent
Namibia. Rather, that distinction goes to the Council for Namibia
which. although not a state according to traditional legal requirements, has enjoyed a unique legal status. Hence, a new Namibian government. whether controlled by SWAPO or not, may wish
55

to maintain in force any treaties entered into by the Cou ncil. At
the same time, the new government would do well to h onor the
rights of foreign nationals in Namibia such as those eng aged in
the exploitation of natural resources even though these ac UVities
have been illegal since 1966. If the new government fails to give
adequate compensation in instances where it expropriat es the
property of these foreign nationals for public purposes, it Will, no
doubt. discourage the very foreign investment it will h ope to
attract to diversity Namibia's economy.
•
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